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Opinion filed
September 4, 2008

In The

Eleventh Court
of Appeals

__________

No. 11-06-00342-CV

__________

IN THE MATTER OF
T.A.

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 5569

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O
N

This is an appeal from a judgment adjudicating a juvenile
of delinquent conduct.  Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. ' 51.03 (Vernon Supp.
2007) defines delinquent conduct as Aconduct, other than a
traffic offense, that violates a penal law of this state or of the United
States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail.@   The jury
found that T.A. engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of
unauthorized use of a vehicle on six separate occasions.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 31.07 (Vernon
2003).  We affirm.

In his first issue on appeal, appellant argues that the
trial court Acommitted structural
error by showing clear bias towards the State by alerting the prosecution
to a necessary trial amendment.@  The petition
alleged six separate offenses of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle.  One of the offenses alleged that appellant operated a ABlue Oldsmobile
Cutlass, without the effective consent of Raul Villafranco III., the owner
thereof.@
At trial, Paul Villafranco III testified that his blue Oldsmobile Cutlass
was stolen from the parking lot of the store where he worked.
Villafranco testified that the police department misspelled his
name.  The trial court stated, AYou may want to
amend.  You have it alleged as Raul.@  The State
moved to strike the first name from the allegation.  Appellant
objected that the State should not be allowed to amend the pleading during
trial.  The trial court found that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
allowed the amendment.  Appellant contends that the trial court=s comment was a clear
bias toward the State.

Appellant argues that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 28.10(b)
(Vernon 2006) does not allow a trial amendment to the charging instrument
after the trial commences when the defense objects.  However, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 51.17 (Vernon Supp.
2007) states that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern juvenile
proceedings unless otherwise provided. Tex. R. Civ. P. 66 states that
during trial:

[T]he court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining
his . . . defense upon the merits.

The
strict prohibition against amendment of pleadings in criminal cases is not
applicable in juvenile proceedings.  See Carrillo v. State,
480 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. 1972); In re G.A.T., 16 S.W.3d 818, 823
(Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. den=d).  The State
may only amend its petition at Asuch time, and under
such circumstances, as to be basically fair to the minor.@
Carrillo, 480 S.W.2d at 615; In re G.A.T., 16 S.W.3d at
823.  Allowing the State to amend the pleading to correct the
misspelling of the victim=s name did not
prejudice appellant and was not unfair to appellant.

Parties have a right to a fair and impartial trial.
Markowitz v. Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.]
2003, pet. den=d); Metzger v.
Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 37 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied).  One of the fundamental components of a fair
trial is a neutral and detached judge. Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972); Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d at
86.  A judge should act as neither an advocate nor as an adversary
for any party.  Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d at 86.  ATo reverse a judgment
on the ground of improper conduct or comments of the judge, we must find
(1) that judicial impropriety was in fact committed and (2) probable
prejudice to the complaining party.@
Id.  The trial court noted a typographical error in the
pleadings and allowed the State to amend the pleadings as permitted by
Rule 66.  Appellant has not shown that the trial court was biased
toward the State.  Appellant=s first issue on
appeal is overruled.

Appellant complains in his second issue on appeal that the
trial court erred in admitting the social history report and in allowing
testimony from the report.  During the disposition hearing, the State
introduced appellant=s social history
report.  Over objection, Jeff Waugh, with Midland County Juvenile
Probation, testified about his interview with appellant.  Appellant
specifically complains of the information in the report and the testimony
at the disposition hearing concerning appellant=s drug and marihuana
use, appellant=s
involvement in a gang, and appellant running away from home.
Appellant contends that the information was obtained in an Ainterrogation-like
setting without giving [a]ppellant Miranda warnings.@[1]

Appellant relies on In re J.S.S., which states that
Aa juvenile must
be afforded his Fifth Amendment privilege against self‑incrimination from
the conclusion of the adjudication hearing through the conclusion of the
disposition hearing.@  In re
J.S.S., 20 S.W.3d 837, 844 (Tex. App.C El Paso 2000, pet.
den=d).
In J.S.S., the court found that the Fifth Amendment applied to the
juvenile=s
predisposition interview.  Id. at 846.  The court found
that the interview Aexceeded any arguably
neutral purposes when [the probation officer] questioned [the juvenile]
about the facts of the primary offense and the two extraneous
offenses.@
Id.  The two extraneous offenses were the same as the offense
that was the subject of the adjudication hearing.  Id. at
839-40.  The juvenile court judge specifically stated that, in
deciding to place the juvenile in T.Y.C., he took into account that the
juvenile had committed the same offense on two prior occasions.
Id. at 840. The court further noted that its opinion Ashould not be read as
holding that the Fifth Amendment applies to all predisposition interviews
because the facts in a given case may show that the interview served more
neutral purposes, and therefore, did not implicate the juvenile=s Fifth Amendment
rights.@
Id. at 864 n.7.

The record does not show that the community supervision
officer questioned appellant about the specific facts of the alleged
offenses.   The State questioned the community supervision
officer about appellant=s use of drugs or
alcohol in reference to treatment or counseling appellant had
received.  There is nothing in the record to suggest the trial court
considered any extraneous offense in determining appellant=s disposition.
We find that appellant=s Fifth Amendment
rights were not implicated in the predisposition interview.  The
interview served a neutral purpose in determining an appropriate
disposition for appellant.  Appellant=s second issue on
appeal is overruled.

Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court
erred by refusing to allow him to question the prior criminal record of a
witness for the State.   The Sixth Amendment guarantees an
accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses
against him.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).  A  defendant states a
violation of the confrontation clause by showing that he was prohibited
from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross‑examination designed to show
a bias on the part of a witness and thereby to expose to the jury facts
from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness.   Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S.
227, 231 (1988).  We weigh each confrontation clause issue on a
case‑by‑case basis, taking into account the defendant=s right to
cross‑examine and the risk factors associated with admission of the
evidence.  Garcia v. State, 228 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex.
App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref=d).  The trial
court has broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on
cross‑examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral
evidence.  Id.  Montrice Chatman testified at trial that
appellant picked her up at her apartment in a light blue car.
Appellant and Chatman rode around in the car and went to several
friends=
houses.  Appellant told Chatman to wipe her fingerprints off the
car.  When appellant took Chatman home, he parked at a different
apartment complex and walked with Chatman to her apartment complex.
Appellant then asked Chatman to hold the keys to the car.  The
following day at school, Chatman gave the keys to a teacher.  The
police arrived at the school, and Chatman went with the police to show
them the location of the car.

On cross-examination, appellant asked if Chatman was on
probation when she gave a statement to police.  The State objected
that the information was privileged because Chatman was a juvenile.
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard any suggestion that
Chatman was on probation.  Appellant argues that, pursuant to
Davis, the right to effectively cross-examine the witness does not
yield to the policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
juvenile=s
record.

In Davis, the Court found that the State=s interest in the
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings was outweighed by the criminal
defendant=s
right to cross‑examine a juvenile witness about the effect of probationary
status on his testimony.  The trial court=s effort to limit the
scope of this cross‑examination concerning a witness=s juvenile record
violated the Sixth Amendment.  Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to
question Chatman about her probationary
status.

As with other constitutional errors, a violation of the
confrontation clause is subject to harmless error
analysis.    Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
684 (1986); Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991).  In Van Arsdall, the Court set forth factors to
consider in determining whether the error was harmless including:
(1) the importance of the witness=s testimony in the
prosecution=s
case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points; (4) the extent of cross‑examination otherwise
permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution=s case.  Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.

Appellant questioned Chatman on cross-examination about
her statement to police and also about the penalty she faced in being
charged with a State jail felony.  Appellant was alleged to have
committed six different counts of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle.  The State presented strong evidence that appellant engaged
in delinquent conduct.  The trial court=s error in refusing
to allow appellant to cross-examine Chatman about being on community
supervision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a).
Appellant=s
third issue on appeal is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

September 4, 2008

Panel consists of: Wright,
C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange,
J.

[1]Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).